Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: Can the Power of Ideas Tame the Power of the State?

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The nuclear arms control regime—centered on the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—faces five challenges: failure of nuclear disarmament by the five NPT-licit nuclear powers (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States); possible cheating by non-nuclear signatories like North Korea and Iran; India, Israel, and Pakistan remaining outside the NPT; terrorists' interest in acquiring and using nuclear weapons; and the safety, security and proliferation risks of the increased interest in nuclear energy to offset the financial and environmental costs of fossil fuel.

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There was fresh interest in nuclear abolition by a coalition of influential US strategic heavyweights (Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn 2007, 2008). This was given a major fillip by President Barack Obama's speech in Prague in April 2009. On the other side, a group of former NATO generals issued a call for a commitment to the first use of nuclear weapons to prevent undesirable actors from acquiring and using them (CSIS 2008).

The world faced a potential nuclear crossroads in 2010 with several milestones: a US Nuclear Posture Review that reduced the role of nuclear weapons and put additional restrictions on their use, a new Russia–US treaty that cuts strategic arsenals by about one-third, an April summit in Washington that pledged to tighten the security of nuclear materials and trade, and a five-year NPT Review Conference in New York in May. The calendar was ticking also on Iran's suspected weapons program and how to respond.

Can policymakers draw on the expertise of scholars to address these challenges? Can scholars summarize their research into policy-relevant recommendations with the requisite crispness, clarity, and implementability? How can the normally isolated worlds of ideas and action work together to produce policy proposals to take the world out of the seeming rut of a deadlocked nuclear arms control agenda?

Regulating the weapons of warfare can limit the casualty toll of armed conflicts and lessen the temptation to go to war because of an abundant—if not

excess—supply of weaponry. This article is organized around the four questions posed by the editors: the major theoretical approaches, fit between scholarship and practice, optimum engagement among them, and likely future directions.

Theoretical Approaches: Peace Research vs Strategic Studies

The dominant scholarly approaches can usefully be grouped under the contrasting broad headings of peace research (PR) and strategic studies (SS). For example, nuclear disarmament fits more comfortably within the analytical framework of PR, while a focus on nonproliferation to the neglect of disarmament reveals a SS bias. Both fall into the "applied research" stream and have been intellectually challenged for it (Buzan 1982). Most countries seem to tap expertise in SS institutes, while ignoring much of the PR and conflict resolution expertise.

During the Cold War, the logic of realist analyses produced policy prescriptions of containment of the evil empire through a posture of armed strength. Peace researchers argued that the adversarial approach intensified mutual antagonisms, fed the conventional and nuclear arms race, and increased the probability of war by design or accident. In the nuclear age, the two principal Cold War antagonists shared an interest in reciprocal self-preservation more powerful than their apparent enmity. In some ways, the early peace researchers anticipated the politics of antagonistic collaboration that was to produce the period of detente in the 1970s–1980s with growing interest in peace studies because of the heightened anxiety about the precarious state of the nuclear peace (Allan and Goldmann 1995).

During the Cold War, the literature was strongly weighted toward SS. The balance tilted toward PR with the end of the Cold War, both because of the diminution of the prospect of a transcendental war between the superpowers and because the major powers themselves became more interested in cooperating to contain conflicts among others than exploiting regional conflicts for their own agendas. The broadened definition of security to embrace human and other nontraditional notions of security fit comfortably within PR, but awkwardly in the national security analytical framework.

The two approaches have separate journals and publications. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (SS) publications includes the acclaimed Adelphi Papers and the annual *Military Balance* and *Strategic Survey*. The annual *Disarmament Yearbook*, published by the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, is just as acclaimed in the peace research and policy communities. The major scholarly journals in PR are the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* and the *Journal of Peace Research. Security Dialogue* is normatively closer to PR than SS, reflecting its institutional links to the Peace Research Institute of Oslo. There are innumerable research institutions and think tanks that also illustrate the division into PR and SS: the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, the Department of Defence-funded Australian Strategic Policy Institute in Canberra, are complemented by peace research institutes in Copenhagen, Frankfurt, Oslo, Stockholm, Tampere, etc. alongside university departments at Notre Dame, Uppsala, Bradford and Queensland. Northern Europe has the highest "peace research density" in the world (see UNESCO 2000).

At any given time, most of the countries in the world are at peace but ready to go to war if necessary. Therein lies the key to the difference between peace research and SS. PR aims to control the manifestation of arms and violence, including structural violence—poverty and malnutrition take a far deadlier toll on many more people each year than direct violence by soldiers—and question their utility in promoting societal values (Wallensteen 1988; Rogers and Ramsbo-

tham 1999; Evangelista 2005). It is an etiology of conflict and conflict resolution (Isard 1992; Kurtz 2008).

Strategic studies are infused with realist assumptions that violence is endemic, inevitable and an instrument of statecraft in the relentless struggle for power among autonomous states. The task of strategic analysts is to predict courses of action that will enable states to maximize their own power while neutralizing or minimizing the national power of opponents, so that the conflict is resolved on one's own terms and not that of the enemy (Baylis, Wirtz, and Gray 2010). Peace research challenges the basic tenets of conventional analyses of violence and offers critical alternatives. Does the evidence support the claim that if we want peace, we must prepare for war? Or do preparations for war cause war, or make it more likely? For SS, the most critical lesson of the interwar period (1919–39) is that pacifism and appeasement do not work against the Hitlers of the world. Peace researchers do not dispute this but point to the injustice and inequity of the Treaty of Versailles, and the subsequent treatment of Germany from within the realist paradigm, as having spawned Hitler in the first place.

Possibilities for the breakdown of peace exist everywhere, anytime. The task for SS is to identify them through the exploration of worst-case scenarios. Possibilities for building peace exist in every crisis. The challenge for PR is to identify them through best-case scenarios.

Unusually, among academic disciplines, PR "triangulates" data, theory, and values to insist upon the search for peace by peaceful means (Galtung 1996). It argues that nonviolent alternatives are not given serious enough consideration, while the indirect costs and harmful legacies of armed violence are always underestimated (Sharp 1973; Boserup and Mack 1975). An additional and enduring cost of war is the mimetic nature of violence, creating the conditions for the eruption of later violence by being emulated or mimed (Girard 1979).

PR changes focus from security of the state to welfare of individuals and the system. For strategists, the key question on Kashmir is how best to secure the province against the threat from India or Pakistan. So when India acquired nuclear weapons capability, from within the SS framework, Pakistan followed suit. For a peace researcher, it is equally legitimate to ask how best to protect the people of Kashmir from terrorists, security forces, and an India–Pakistan nuclear war. The threats posed by the state's administrative, judicial, police, paramilitary, and military structures to individual and group rights, and by the bilateral nuclear equation to international and environmental security, are alien to SS but central to PR.

A radical conceptual shift—and the most significant for peace research—was from "national security" with focus on military defense of the state, to "human security" with emphasis on protecting the individual from life-threatening threats from direct and structural violence. The rise of human security—an essentially contested concept (Gallie 1956)—has been attributed to six factors (MacFarlane and Khong 2006:6–9). The participants in armed conflict broadened from a narrow elite to mass conscripts. The industrial–scientific revolutions dramatically increased the range, lethality, and accuracy of firepower, so that the state had to accept growing numbers of its own people being killed in the effort to protect them. The ultimate paradox came with nuclear weapons and strategies of mutually assured destruction. Many regimes took to murdering large numbers of their own people. In the wake of decolonization, many states emerged lacking the capacity to assure their citizens' security or exert authority over the resources later captured by predatory groups who used the principle of sovereignty and nonintervention to shield themselves from external pressure. The collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the confrontational, militarized, and state-centric Cold War opened space for alternative conceptions of order and security. Finally,

globalization has helped to reduce the salience of the state and of military threats and defenses.

National security is an artifice of the realists' imagination, a politically constructed concept. State security does not have privileged claim over such other needs for human beings as food, water, and air. Human security helps peace researchers to translate the arid SS language of "countervalue targets," "flexible response," and "collateral damage" into human terms of civilians killed in the millions, food-growing soil poisoned for decades, and whole communities destroyed or displaced.

Given its historical evolution and normative mandate, the United Nations falls squarely into the PR and human security camp. Going to war was an acknowledged attribute of state sovereignty and war itself was an accepted institution of the Westphalian system with distinctive rules, etiquette, norms, and stable patterns of practices to govern armed conflicts (Holsti 1996). The main protection against aggression was countervailing power, which increased both the risk of failure and the cost of victory. Since 1945, the UN has spawned a corpus of law to stigmatize the act, threat, and instruments of aggression and create a robust norm against it.

Fit between Theory and Practice

While many instinctive UN supporters might well embed the organization in the intellectual tradition of peace research, the organization has its institutional antecedents in the wartime alliance among the UK, US, and USSR. Hence, the tension between idealism and realism is integral to the UN project and extends to its handling of nuclear weapons. The UN Charter was adopted at San Francisco six weeks before Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In time, the five permanent members of the Security Council coincidentally became the five licit nuclear weapons states (NWS) under the NPT. Given their privileged role in international law enforcement, they prioritized the NPT nonproliferation obligations while continually downgrading the article 6 disarmament clause.

UNESCO's Preamble declares that if wars begin in the minds of people, then it is in their minds that the defenses of peace must be constructed. Thus, the primary forum for the transformation, from a culture of war among heavily armed states to a culture of peace among barely armed nations, must be the classroom and the laboratory. The principle that knowledge produced in universities and think tanks should be made available to the policy community is unexceptionable. In practice, the chief difficulty seems to be the lack of a common vocabulary for scholars and practitioners to engage in an informed discourse.

In the case of nuclear weapons policies, with the exception of highly formalized rational choice theories, this is less of a problem for SS than for peace research. By its very nature, the former is more policy oriented, while the latter can be highly "theoretical." Alternatively, when theoretical models or deeply intricate normative arguments are distilled into short policy recommendations, they become easy targets for dismissive remarks like a peacenik's manifesto, or Utopian dreams lacking in realism, or even for posing a threat to national security by trying to weaken national defense preparedness. In very few countries would PR have a constituency inside government. By contrast, departments of defense, defense forces, intelligence agencies, and foreign services would be eager to recruit the best and brightest SS graduates. However, nuclear arms control and disarmament specialists are welcome in international organizations.

Decision makers are often confronted by "precarious ignorance" of incomplete information, and potentially disastrous consequences of decisions based on inadequate knowledge (John Asplund, quoted in Wiberg 2005:6). The description is applicable to the 2003 Iraq war and potentially to a military strike on Iran

to destroy its suspected nuclear weapons program. To be taken seriously by poli-cymakers, scholars have to learn to speak their language, to get and stay inside the dominant discourse. Many PR scholars are hesitant to do so because they fear being co-opted to serve war-making agendas. Many are reluctant to simplify their analyses and conclusions, eschewing caveats and qualifications to offer rec-ommendations with the degree of certainty that decision-makers demand. And so they end up sharing the fate of Cassandra: blessed with the gift of prophecy but cursed with not being believed.

Perhaps the more significant impact that ideas have had on policy is first through a revolving door system of insider–outsider roles—Pierre Trudeau and potentially Michael Ignatieff in Canada; Henry Kissinger, Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Krasner, and Anne-Marie Slaughter in the United States; and Francis Deng, Michael Doyle, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Sachs, and Amartya Sen in the UN—and second as public intellectuals (with some overlap in the two groups). Scholars are often eager to lend their expertise for the public good and derive satisfaction from making a difference that cannot be given a monetary value. Certainly, many good and great scholars worked for UN University projects—which generally fell under the PR umbrella—for modest honoraria.

Global Governance: the Terrain on which Theory Meets Practice

Both the scholar and the practitioner are engaged in solving puzzles, albeit from different entry points. The crossroads on which they meet is global governance. The clearest way to comprehend the relevance of using the lens of global gover-nance is by examining five "gaps" between pressing global problems and feeble global solutions (Weiss and Thakur 2010). The first gap is that of knowledge. Often, there is little consensus about the nature, gravity, and magnitude of a problem with respect to the facts, theoretical explanation, and best remedies.

Factually, is Iran's interest limited to nuclear energy or is it engaged in a clan-destine pursuit of nuclear weapons and, if so, how many years away is it from weaponization? Is Pakistan's nuclear arsenal secured from being stolen by Islamists? What is North Korea's exact nuclear weapons capability? *Theoretically*, will the threat and imposition of sanctions or of air strikes, a combination of both, or neither, be effective in stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and rolling back North Korea's program? What is the best strategy for preventing the nuclear proliferation, eliminating existing stockpiles, and avoiding their use? Was the long peace (Gaddis 1987) in Europe kept by nuclear deterrence, Western European integration, Western European democratization, or all three? To be of interest to policymakers, scholars would need both subject (nuclear proliferation) and regional (Iran, Europe, South Asia, Koreas) expertise.

Few governments are prepared to release all information on their weapons inventories to others; most will publish some information; all are sensitive to how it is presented and have laws punishing unauthorized access to and release of classi-fied military information. The main international repositories of information for nuclear and chemical weapons are the UN Secretariat, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Similarly, the UN Conventional Arms Register aims at the most authoritative data collection. It has the merits but also the shortcomings of relying on official reports from governments. Some research institutions collect informa-tion from a variety of open sources and publish them in conveniently accessed compendiums like yearbooks or periodic reports. Analysts and commentators will look to these additional sources compiled chiefly by scholars and researchers.

The theoretical knowledge gaps are the provenance of researchers. There is a large literature on the various associations, correlations, and causations between the variables of arms levels and the onset of war, or between military

expenditures and economic development. Although there is no limit to the role of scholars in filling knowledge gaps, past predictions from experts regarding the development and acquisition of arms have been notoriously inaccurate (Potter and Mukhatzhanova 2008).

We know most details of the inventories in the nuclear arsenals of the five NPT-licit powers. But we can only make informed guesses about the two self-declared possessors of nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan, and less well-informed guesses about the deliberately ambiguous non-NPT nuclear power, Israel. With suspected NPT cheats like Iran and North Korea, the situation becomes decidedly murky. The same is true of nonstate actors. The existence and extent of A.Q. Khan's underground nuclear bazaar—which came to light in 2003 after Libya renounced the nuclear option and began cooperating in the verified dismantling of its clandestine infrastructure—caught everyone by surprise (Clary 2004). Conversely, most western commentators were proven embarrassingly wrong in the assumption that Saddam Hussein had some level of nuclear weapons capability.

Once a threat or problem has been identified and diagnosed, the next step is to help solidify a new norm of behavior. Since 1945, the norm of nuclear abstinence has become firmly established. Norms more than the infrastructure and doctrines of deterrence have anathematized nuclear weapons to entrench the taboo against their use, even at the price of accepting defeat on the battlefield against non-nuclear enemies in Vietnam and Afghanistan (Price and Tannenwald 1996).

Four high-profile international commissions have reaffirmed and attempted to strengthen international nuclear norms. The Canberra Commission argued that the case for their elimination rested on three propositions: their destructive power robs them of military utility against other NWS and renders them politically and morally indefensible against non-nuclear states; it defies credulity that they can be retained in perpetuity and never used by design or inadvertence; and their possession by some stimulates others to acquire them (Canberra Commission 1996:18–22). The 1999 Tokyo Forum repeated the alarm. The WMD Commission (Blix 2006) is more likely to reinforce the anti-WMD norm than be remembered for major new policy recommendations. The report of the Evans–Kawaguchi Commission was more creative in trying to navigate its way through critical nuclear choices (ICNND 2009). It integrates minimization of numbers, role, and visibility of nuclear weapons in the short and medium term with their elimination in the long term; it bridges the gap between the NPT and post-NPT worlds by arguing for nuclear abolition to be enshrined in a universal, comprehensive, legally binding, and verifiable nuclear weapons convention; it abandons the conceptually and operationally untenable distinction between the five NPT-licit NWS and the three non-NPT nuclear armed states, as all eight belong in the same policy basket; and it strikes a balance between the desirability and inevitability of a move toward greater reliance on nuclear energy, and the safety, security, and proliferation risks posed by increased nuclear power generation.

Blue ribbon international commissions seldom produce dramatic shifts in thinking. But, as the conduit for bringing ideas into intergovernmental forums, they do make a difference over the long term in various subtle and nuanced ways (Thakur, Cooper, and English 2005). Scholars can be asked to join as commissioners or researchers. As Head of the federal government-funded Peace Research Centre, this author provided the background paper to the Canberra Commission on the case for a nuclear-weapon-free world (Thakur 1996a). Richard Falk and Michael Ignatieff were members of the independent commission that examined NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Ignatieff, Gisèle Côté-Harper, and Thakur were members of ICISS, while Thomas G. Weiss was its research co-director. Stephen Stedman was the research director for the UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Response in

2004. Scholars can also join practitioners to call for new commissions: the precursor to the Blix Commission on WMD was an op-ed written by Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament at the time, and Ramesh Thakur, Senior Vice Rector of the UN University and UN Assistant Secretary-General at the time (Dhanapala and Thakur 2002).

With respect to institutional gaps, institutions in which norms and policies are housed include technical and material denial regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group; interdiction and enforcement regimes like the Proliferation Security Initiative; ongoing negotiation and discussion arrangements like the Six Party talks on North Korea; and formal organizations like the IAEA, the OPCW, and the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO). Here, scholars can study the effectiveness of design and identify facilitating or disabling conditions to explain successful or failed institutions. They can explain what constitutes a nuclear-weapon-free zone, why particular zones have been established, and with what degree of success (Thakur 1998b); they can also debate the general proposition whether such zones serve any real purpose or are merely statements of good intentions. But the actual negotiations to create new zones can only be undertaken by officials.

Similarly, scholars can identify implementation, compliance, and enforcement gaps like the lack of verification machinery and compliance mechanisms for the disarmament obligations of the NPT, the lack of a credible and binding inspections regime for nonproliferation, and the lack of agreed criteria to assess proliferation threats. So too can former officials and government ministers, constituted into an eminent persons panel and assisted by researchers, identify various gaps and propose remedies (HLP 2004). But the task of filling the gaps has to be left to practitioners.

It is relatively easier to identify roles for scholars in the natural sciences. To promote arms control and disarmament, they can conduct research into managing the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, improving the physical security of nuclear material and facilities, verifying a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and strengthening the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) (Royal Society 2010). Much of this can be performed in advance to enhance the prospects of arms control and disarmament agreements. For example, the CTBTO has spent around one billion dollars over the last 12 years to build, operate, and maintain the highly technical International Monitoring System that links 320 monitoring stations and 16 laboratories in nearly 90 countries. Its antecedents lie in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts, set up by the Conference on Disarmament, that developed and tested approaches to the seismic monitoring of nuclear test explosions from the mid-1970s onward. Its work, undertaken even in the midst of the Cold War, was essential for laying the scientific groundwork for the CTBT negotiations.

Only the scientific community can identify the options and tradeoffs that will be required among levels of confidence, cost, complexity, vulnerability, uncertainties, adequacy and robustness of evidence, and the potential and limitations of technology. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change provides one model for how the work of physical scientists can be communicated to and used by social scientists to study social, economic and political implications, and policy requirements, despite the risks of "politicization" of science. Norway's Foreign Minister has speculated about the creation of a matching Intergovernmental Panel on Nuclear Disarmament (Støre 2008). The two most prominent organizations of natural and health scientists acting as global pressure groups for arms control and disarmament are the Pugwash Conference and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, both of which have several national chapters and both are Nobel Peace Laureates. Social scientists have to engage practitioners in one of the several more diffuse methods and fora discussed in this article.

A common mode of influencing public opinion and public policy is to become a public intellectual utilizing the growing media outlets to communicate one's views and prescriptions to the engaged public. A regular column in the *New York Times* has given Paul Krugman, for example, a far larger readership than ever he could have reached with his scholarly papers. To achieve public and policy impact, it is important that the op-eds be written for major national or international newspapers. The two global newspapers are the Financial Times and the International Herald Tribune (IHT).

In the annals of UN achievements, the author's biggest claim to fame might turn out to be publishing more than 50 op-eds for the IHT as a serving senior official. Many were on the topic of nonproliferation and disarmament, which attempted to clarify, explain, and elucidate, or outright prescribe. Were they influential? An article recommending adoption of the mine-ban treaty was published on the morning of the crucial vote on it at the Oslo conference in 1997 (Thakur 1997). Almost all countries would have settled on their national positions by then already; were even a few waverers brought back into the fold? An earlier article recommending an effort to trade a permanent Security Council seat for India's signature of the NPT (Thakur 1993) was never even attempted. On the other side, the accurate warning in 1996 that the effort to impose a test-ban treaty on India would be counter-productive was based more on a basic reading of Indian politics than prescience.[1]

As for practitioners reading the scholarly literature, desk officer-level national and international civil servants do so in their specialized areas of responsibility. In the case of arms control and disarmament, this includes *Arms Control Today*, the *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, *Disarmament Diplomacy*, the *Disarmament Forum*, and the *Nonproliferation Review*. These journals are important vehicles for scholars who want to communicate their research results and policy prescriptions to the policy community. Officials from the policy world are far less likely to read journals that focus solely on conceptual and theoretical debates, even if they are very highly regarded by the scholars. Thus, *International Organization, International Security,* and *International Studies Quarterly* are excellent outlets for publishing articles that will be read by serious scholars and enhance career advancement and reputation in academia, while *Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy,* and the *Washington Quarterly*—which avoid minutiae, acronyms, and narrow debates conducted in the jargon of insiders—will reach a wider policy audience and help to make a difference in the world of practice.

The Next Few Years

The answer to the question of how we move forward in connecting scholars and practitioners can be discussed in the context of important changes in the theory and practice of diplomacy (Watson 2004; Berridge 2005; Jönsson and Hall 2005; Barston 2006). The typical international actors are states and the bulk of diplomacy involves relations among states directly, or among states, international organizations and other international actors. Yet, we operate in a global environment vastly more challenging, complex, and demanding than a 100 years ago.

As the world of diplomacy has changed from the older, exclusive, and self-contained "club" to the newer "networked" model (Heine 2008), so the opportunities have multiplied for scholars to join and participate in the network at numerous points. They can comprise the extensive networks that are created in

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[1]"Without concrete disarmament on the part of the NWS, the world will slip back into real dangers of horizontal proliferation. So the choice is between progress and reversal, not between progress and the status quo" (Thakur 1996a); "Faced with US-led UN coercion, an isolated, sullen and resentful India is more likely to respond with an open nuclear programme, including a … series of nuclear tests" (Thakur 1996b).

the meticulous presummit preparations by national teams of diplomats and offi-
cials, most easily through think tank affiliations. They can be participants in
Track Two diplomacy. In 1996, the Centre for Strategic and International Stud-
ies in Jakarta, the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Munich, and the Peace
Research Centre in Canberra teamed up, under the sponsorship of the Euro-
pean Union and the governments of Germany and Australia, to organize a Track
Two seminar on nonproliferation for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The
seminar, held in Jakarta, was chaired jointly by Jusuf Wanandi, Winrich Kuehne,
and Ramesh Thakur from the three partner institutions. Its purpose was to dis-
cuss the challenge of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the
Asia Pacific region; the adequacy of the current available international and regio-
nal instruments for meeting the challenge; and the measures that might be
adopted to strengthen the barriers to proliferation and to encourage further
disarmament (Thakur 1998a). Earlier, the Australian government had used the
Peace Research Centre in background work for the successful negotiation of the
Chemical Weapons Convention and also for the successful NPT Review and
Extension Conference in 1995.

International organizations have their own research units and many of these
routinely involve scholars, sometimes recruited to join the organizations as
officials, more commonly as consultants on project-specific contracts. The UN
University's Peace and Governance Programme, for example, invited Christophe
Carle, Stephen Cohen, and Trevor Findlay to write chapters on South Asian
nuclear issues and weapons of mass destruction (Carle 2004; Cohen 2004;
Findlay 2006). It completed a major project in partnership with the New York-
based International Peace Academy on the arms control implication of the 2003
Iraq War (Sidhu and Thakur 2006). It would often bring back a selection of
scholars after the completion of a project or on publication of the resulting book
to briefing seminars in national, regional (e.g., Addis Ababa), or UN capitals
(Geneva, New York). Its multi-partner project on the UN's role in regulating
nuclear orders was completed in 2009 (Boulden, Thakur, and Weiss 2009).

The main research body in the UN system charged with studying arms control
and disarmament issues is the Geneva-based UN Institute for Disarmament
Research (UNIDIR), which maintains an active research and publications pro-
gram. Its then Director Patricia Lewis and UNU Vice Rector Thakur wrote a joint
article describing the complex system of the UN's role in nuclear arms control
(Lewis and Thakur 2004). The UNU collaborated with the OPCW in a study
examining the Chemical Weapons Convention (Thakur and Haru 2006) and
worked with USG Dhanapala in a joint China–UN arms control conference in
Beijing in 2002 (Thakur 2002). The mantle of the UN University was useful in
being able to write and publish articles relatively free of official control and vet-
ting, including newspaper op-eds (Thakur 2007).

Scholars can be asked to join governmental and intergovernmental advisory
bodies, for example, the UN Secretary-General's advisory group on disarmament.
The author used to be a member of the Public Advisory Committee on Disarma-
ment and Arms Control in New Zealand, a statutory body to tender advice to the
Minister for Disarmament, and of the National Consultative Committee on Peace
and Disarmament, which functioned as an advisory group to the Australian for-
eign minister. The German delegation to the 2010 NPT conference included
Harald Mueller of the Frankfurt Peace Research Institute. All governments
should tap into existing scholarly expertise by utilizing and expanding such
structured opportunities for interaction. This can be performed ahead of the
publication of official policy papers like the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review or
periodic defense white papers; in advance of international gatherings like the
NPT 5-year review conferences; for briefing NGOs and citizens after such
international gatherings, etc. Government departments often find it difficult to

tolerate, let alone to encourage, contrarian thinking. To escape the policy rigidity of groupthink, they should sponsor and attend seminars and workshops on the pressing challenges of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament with a diverse group of scholars, public intellectuals, and officials attending in their personal capacity, much like the ARF Track Two seminar in 1996.

In turn, scholars should realize that, faced with time pressures and information overload, practitioners need policy-relevant advice with immediate urgency, shorn of confusing caveats, and presented in clear and concise language and format. Practitioners are not and never will be interested in theories per se. It is up to scholars to link theories to actor behavior and make policy recommendations on that basis to promote national security without endangering international security. And they will have to learn not to betray or abuse confidential information provided by such privileged access. Finally, professional bodies like the International Studies Association could also play their part by actively fostering joint scholar–practitioner panels at their annual conventions, including on the subject of nuclear arms control and disarmament.

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